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Access to justice is one of the promises of Minnesota. This
promise is reflected in our constitution, where the people of
Minnesota promised each other that in our state each individual
has the right “to obtain justice freely . . . promptly and without
1
delay.” Given the import our founders placed on access to justice,
the delivery on that promise may rightly be described as a “first
2
principle” of Minnesota. In this article, we begin with a historical
perspective on Minnesota’s commitment to the first principle of
access to justice. Then, we turn to the present reality regarding
that commitment here and elsewhere, focusing on some of the
consequences of a less-than-steadfast adherence to the timely
delivery of access to justice. Finally, we conclude with
recommendations to ensure that the promise of access to justice
continues to be a reality in Minnesota.

† Lorie S. Gildea is the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
†† Matt Tews was Chief Justice Lorie S. Gildea’s judicial clerk for the
2011–2012 term.
1. Article I, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution provides: “Every person
is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may
receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and
without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay,
conformable to the laws.”
2. Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist papers that first principles
were “primary truths upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 236 (Alexander Hamilton) (Howard Mumford Jones ed.,
1972).
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Minnesotans have long understood that access to justice
3
requires the courts to be open to all. This bedrock principle is
enshrined in Article I, Section 8 of our constitution, and it is also
the focus of one of our supreme court’s earliest cases, Davis v.
4
Pierse. The case was decided against the backdrop of the Civil War,
and it involved a statute passed by our Legislature that was
intended to aid the Union in its “efforts to put down
5
[the] . . . rebellion.” In that statute, the Legislature “suspend[ed]
the privilege of all persons aiding the rebellion . . . [from]
prosecuting and defending actions and judicial proceedings” in
6
Minnesota. F.A.W. Davis, a resident and citizen of the secessionist
State of Mississippi, sought redress in a Minnesota court in
connection with property located in Minnesota in which Davis
claimed an interest. The statute, however, ostensibly prevented
7
Davis from pressing a claim in Minnesota state court.
8
Davis argued the statute was unconstitutional and void. The
court agreed. Speaking eloquently for the court, our first chief
justice, Lafayette Emmett, described the Legislature’s decision to
pass such a law in the midst of national crisis as “forgetting justice,
and disregarding the wholesome restraints of our fundamental
9
law.” After rejecting various grounds on which to save the statute,
Chief Justice Emmett concluded that while striking the statute
down may be unpopular, all Minnesotans “must regard as [a]
matter of pride and gratulation, that in this State no one, not even
10
the worst of felons, can be denied the right to simple justice.”
The result in Davis v. Pierse is grounded in the importance our
11
supreme court placed on the principle of access to justice. That
priority is also reflected in how the courts in Minnesota are
organized, funded, and governed. Based on the principle that all
in Minnesota are entitled to access to justice, our court system
transformed itself in the last century to be better positioned to
3. See Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 23, 7 Gil. 1, 11 (1862) (“[I]n this State no
one, not even the worst of felons, can be denied the right to simple justice.”).
4. Id. at 23, 7 Gil. at 11.
5. Id. at 16, 7 Gil. at 3.
6. Id. at 15, 7 Gil. at 3.
7. Id. at 17, 7 Gil. at 6.
8. Id. at 14, 7 Gil. at 1–2.
9. Id. at 16, 7 Gil. at 4.
10. Id. at 23, 7 Gil. at 11.
11. See id.
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deliver access to justice to all. The process was a long one,
beginning in the late 1980s and not concluding until the 21st
century was in its infancy.
Prior to the transformation, Minnesota’s court system was
12
funded primarily at the county level. This county-funded system
had many disadvantages, including an unequal delivery of services,
“[s]everance of . . . policy decisions from the funding decisions,”
“[f]ragmented and . . . limited fiscal oversight,” and the
dependence of the third branch of state government on the
13
uncoordinated decisions of eighty-seven county governments. In
order to remedy these problems, in 1989 the judiciary embarked
14
on a fifteen-year transformation toward exclusive state funding.
15
Complete state funding was achieved on July 1, 2005. The fact
that the Minnesota Judiciary’s funding now comes from one source
helps to present a unified and coordinated budgetary message. It
also helps to ensure that the funding provided to the Judicial
Branch is used to promote branch-wide strategic initiatives and
16
priorities.
As part of the transition to state funding, in 2005 the judiciary
also introduced a new governance model. By order of chief justice
Kathleen Blatz, the policy-making authority for the Judicial Branch
17
was delegated to the newly formed Minnesota Judicial Council.
The Judicial Council, a twenty-five-member body chaired by the
chief justice, is made up of nineteen judges, including the chief
judge of the court of appeals and the chief judge of each of the
ten judicial districts, five court administrators, and one “at-large
18
appointment from within the Judicial Branch.” Council members
work in courthouses around the state and at both the district and
19
appellate levels.
20
The “right to simple justice” that Chief Justice Emmett wrote
about in Davis v. Pierse means that the people of Minnesota deserve
12. See Sue Dosal, Transition and Transformation: The Minnesota State Funding
Project, 22 CT. MANAGER 18, 18 (2007).
13. Id. at 18–19.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id. at 23.
16. See id. at 18–23.
17. In re Order Establishing Judicial Council, Adm-04-8003 (Minn. Dec. 10,
2004).
18. Membership, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=1055
(last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
19. Id.
20. Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 23, 7 Gil. 1, 11 (1862).
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a court system that provides equal access to timely justice no matter
where in the state they live. In other words, justice should look the
same all around Minnesota. With the transition to state funding
complete, and through the leadership of the Judicial Council, the
judiciary in Minnesota is better positioned to ensure that all
Minnesotans have the same access to justice, and thereby honor the
“right to simple justice.”
II. PRESENT REALITY
Davis v. Pierse stands for the principle that closing the
courthouse doors to even one person, “even the worst of felons,”
and even in a time of crisis, impugns “our fundamental law” and
21
denies the constitutional “right to simple justice.”
Yet in
Minnesota and across our nation, judicial budget constraints are
22
threatening—quite literally—to close courthouse doors.
Bill
Robinson, President of the American Bar Association, expressed
the problem in these terms: “The simple truth is inadequate
funding threatens to undermine the ability of our state courts to
23
function properly.”
The problem of inadequate funding has put America’s state
24
25
26
courts in crisis.
From Washington
to Florida
and
21.
22.

Id.
See, e.g., ROY WEINSTEIN & STEVAN PORTER, ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA OF FUNDING CUTBACKS
AFFECTING THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 2 (2009) (stating that funding cuts
caused the Los Angeles Superior Court to close on the third Wednesday of each
month); Herbert B. Dixon, The Real Danger of Inadequate Court Funding, 51 JUDGES’
J. 1, 43 (2012) (“[T]he failure of state and local legislatures to provide adequate
funding is effectively—at times quite literally—closing the doors of our justice
system.”); Karen Weise, U.S. Courts Face Backlogs and Layoffs, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK.,
Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2011-04-27/u-dot-s-dot
-courts-face-backlogs-and-layoffs (discussing how Alabama was forced to close
courts on Fridays to keep costs down).
23. Letter from Bill Robinson III, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Lorie S.
Gildea, Chief Justice, Minn. Supreme Court (Jan. 24, 2012) (on file with
addressee).
24. AM. BAR ASS’N, CRISIS IN THE COURTS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM 1 (2012)
[hereinafter CRISIS IN THE COURTS] (“The courts of our country are in crisis.”).
25. See generally COURT FUNDING TASK FORCE, BD. FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUSTICE
IN JEOPARDY: THE COURT FUNDING CRISIS IN WASHINGTON STATE (2004) [hereinafter
CRISIS IN WASHINGTON] (describing the funding situation in Washington state).
26. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE COST OF JUSTICE: BUDGETARY THREATS
TO AMERICA’S COURTS 5 (2006) [hereinafter COST OF JUSTICE] (describing how a
$100 million cut to the judicial budget forced the chief justice of the Florida
Supreme Court to beg the state bar to lobby for court funding).
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28

Maine to California, courts are struggling to provide quality
judicial services. Across the nation, studies have shown that today’s
courts are “less efficient, and judicial decisionmaking is
29
[becoming] less expedient.” And in some states, long delays and
inefficiencies are threatening to deny citizens a “basic access to
30
justice.”
The cause of this unprecedented crisis is decreasing judicial
31
branch budgets. While state court budgets have been in decline
32
over the last decade, the financial crisis beginning in 2008
33
brought on the deepest cuts. In the three years after 2008, “the
courts of most states [were] forced to make do with 10 to 15% less
34
funding than they had in 2007.” These cuts were made despite
the fact that the courts of every state make up only a tiny portion of
the overall budget; “not a single state in America spends more than
4 percent of its annual budget on its judiciary, and . . . many states
35
fund their courts at less than 1 percent.” In many jurisdictions,
the cuts have been exacerbated by the increased filings that have
36
accompanied the economic downturn.
27. Criminal Justice System Faces Crises Due to State Budget Cuts, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Oct. 26, 2011, available at http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2011/10
/criminal_justice_system_faces.html (discussing how, since 2007, Maine’s judiciary
budget has been cut but the court system has seen a fifty percent increase in civil
filings).
28. See generally WEINSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 22, at 2–16 (describing how a
lack of funding has negatively affected California’s, and especially Los Angeles’,
courts).
29. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE
IMPACT OF RECENT BUDGET CUTS IN NEW YORK STATE COURT FUNDING 1 (2012).
30. Editorial, Threadbare American Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2011, at A20
[hereinafter Threadbare American Justice].
31. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 3.
32. Dixon, supra note 22, at 1.
33. See CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 4.
34. Id.
35. Edwin Meese III & William T. Robinson, Our Liberty Depends on Funding
Our Courts, So They Can Protect All of Us, FOX NEWS, Jan. 16, 2012,
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/01/16/our-liberty-depends-on-funding
-our-courts-so-can-protect-all-us/; see also COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 2–3 (“In
most states, the entire budget for the state judicial system amounts to less than
four percent of the state’s overall annual budget.”).
36. WASHINGTON ECON. GRP., INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE GEORGIA
ECONOMY OF DELAYS IN GEORGIA’S STATE COURTS DUE TO RECENT REDUCTIONS IN
FUNDING FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3–4 (2011) [hereinafter DELAYS IN GEORGIA]
(discussing that caseloads are increasing while the judiciary budget is decreasing
in Georgia); John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2011, at A18 (noting that courts are seeing an increased case load as a
result of the financial crisis).
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State judicial branches have responded to this decrease in
37
38
Courts in Alabama,
financial support in a variety of ways.
39
40
41
42
43
California, Oregon, Iowa, South Carolina, and Ohio have
been forced to close courthouses on certain days of the week. New
Hampshire’s chief justice effectively suspended civil jury trials for a
44
year. Delaware and Oregon have even had to postpone criminal
45
trials. Many states, including New York and Kansas, have either
46
The judicial
raised filing fees, increased surcharges, or both.
branches of South Carolina, California, Colorado, and
Connecticut, among others, have laid off, furloughed, or frozen the
47
hiring of employees. And most drastically, some states, including
Washington, Utah, and California, have permanently closed some
48
courthouses.
We, in Minnesota, have not been immune to the crisis. In
2003, it was estimated that, due to extremely high caseloads caused
by a shrinking budget, our district court judges had on average only
49
120 seconds of court time to spend on many case types. More
50
recently, our court offices have been forced to keep shorter hours.
And with funding cuts leaving the judiciary with ten percent fewer
51
people to do the work, “[b]acklogs and delays are increasing in

37. Weise, supra note 22 (describing how some courts have pared spending,
trimmed hours, laid off staff, or delayed trials).
38. Id.
39. WEINSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 22, at 2.
40. Dixon, supra note 22, at 1.
41. Id.
42. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 8.
43. Schwartz, supra note 36.
44. Weise, supra note 22.
45. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 5, 7.
46. Dixon, supra note 22, at 1.
47. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 4–8.
48. Id. at 4, 8.
49. Id. at 6. See generally State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 2004).
50. Jennifer Smith, Justice Denied, Lawyers Unpaid?, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Feb. 9,
2012, 6:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/09/justice-delayed-lawyer
-unpaid.
51. Pam Louwagie, Cuts Could Mean Justice Denied, STAR TRIB., March 22, 2011,
http://www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=113823889 (stating that “[a]bout
250 court positions around the state are vacant”); see also Almanac: Justice Lorie
Gildea (Twin Cities Public Television broadcast May 4, 2012), available at
http://www.mnvideovault.org/mvvPlayer/customPlaylist2.php?id=23422&select
_index=6&popup=yes#0 (stating that because of budget cuts the judiciary is
running “about 10% short of the people [it] needs to do the people’s work”).
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52

Minnesota.”
For example, in 2009, almost one-third of our
serious felony cases took over one year to process, and in some
districts it was taking “more than a year for a misdemeanor case to
53
be set for trial.” On the civil side, the delays caused by inadequate
funding have the business community watching the court system
54
“with increasing concern.” Overall, the budgetary pressure placed
on our court system has negative constitutional, public safety, and
economic impacts.
The potential constitutional consequences of the budgetary
crisis are significant. Both the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions separate government into three distinct branches:
55
executive, legislative, and judicial. One of the primary purposes
of this system is for each branch to balance and check the others, in
56
order to prevent consolidations or abuses of power. It is of vital
importance to this system of checks and balances that the judicial
branch remains independent and coequal with the political
57
branches.
58
Our justice system is the cornerstone of our democracy. The
core constitutional function of the judicial branch is to “protect
individual rights and liberties against overreaching by [the]
political and popular majorities” represented by the other two
59
branches. The courts are where people go to protect or defend
the things that are most dear to them; whether it be their family,
property, or freedom, it is ultimately the justice system that protects
52. DANIEL J. HALL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, RESHAPING THE FACE OF
JUSTICE: THE ECONOMIC TSUNAMI CONTINUES 2 (2011).
53. Id.
54. Weise, supra note 22.
55. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III; MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
56. Meese & Robinson, supra note 35 (“The Founding Fathers separated our
government into three co-equal branches by design, with each, at times, checking
the other branches and holding them to their limited purpose.”).
57. This core principle has been recognized numerous times throughout the
centuries, perhaps never so persuasively as when Montesquieu opined that there is
no liberty “if the power of judging is not separate from legislative power and from
executive power.” MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et
al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1752); see also COST OF JUSTICE, supra note
26, at 1 (“The Constitution . . . establishes a judiciary that is independent from and
equal in stature to the executive and legislative branches.”); cf. JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT: BOOK II, §§ 143, 150, 159 (Ballantyne Press 1884)
(1690) (opining that the separation of powers is the key to good government).
58. See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, supra note 57; see also CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra
note 24, at 19 (“Strong, effective, and independent justice systems are a core
element of our democracy.”).
59. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 2.
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60

the people and safeguards their rights. Despite its important role,
the judicial branch has always been considered the weakest of the
61
three branches. The judiciary lacks the power to fund itself and
strives to separate itself from the political process. As such, the
courts are in “continual jeopardy of being overpowered” by the
62
other branches. One way the political branches can overpower
63
the judicial branch is by cutting its public funding. Inadequate
funding undermines the judicial system’s ability “to fulfill [its]
important constitutional duties” and protect the rights that the
64
public holds dear.
In essence, “[e]ven the most eloquent
65
constitution is worthless with no one to enforce it,” and no one
66
can get “justice if the courts are closed.”
Unfortunately, courts across the country are swamped by huge
dockets and decreasing budgets, and as a result, it is doubtful that
67
any fully deliver the justice that our citizens need and deserve.
When our courts function properly, delivering efficient and
thoughtful results, public confidence in the government is
68
strengthened. But “[w]hen they begin to fail, faith in the entire
69
Thus, “[t]he court crisis
system of government deteriorates.”
affects more than just the justice system. It compromises citizen[s’]
70
faith in our government.” It is therefore of vital constitutional
71
importance that our courts be adequately funded.
60. See Schwartz, supra note 36.
61. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1972) (“[T]he judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of
the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the
other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against
their attacks.” (footnote omitted)).
62. Id.
63. Cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 391 (1819) (noting that the “right
to tax, without limit or control, is essentially a power to destroy”). Likewise, the
power to fund or not to fund is essentially the power to destroy.
64. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 1.
65. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 19.
66. Weise, supra note 22 (quoting Stephen Jack, President, Am. Bar Ass’n)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Threadbare American Justice, supra note 30.
68. See CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 19.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free
government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made
by parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined to pass away.
But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.”); G. Gregg
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Not only do budget constraints impact the judiciary’s ability to
meet its constitutional obligations, but cuts to judicial branches also
have negative consequences for public safety, with high human
costs. A key court function is to ensure public safety and order
through the fair and expeditious handling of criminal cases. But
across the country, delays brought on by the judicial budget crisis
72
are adversely affecting courts’ ability to resolve cases promptly.
The effect is most obvious in the criminal context. The United
States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a
73
speedy trial.
In most states, whether a defendant’s right to a
speedy trial has been violated is determined by statute, criminal
74
procedure, and case law. With many states facing delays in their
criminal dockets, they have been forced to either “warehous[e]
untried defendants in local jails (at additional expense to other
government agencies) or releas[e] potentially violent offenders
simply because further pre-trial detention is either constitutionally
75
impermissible or practically impossible.”
In some states, speedy trial violations—or releases in lieu of
speedy trial violations—have come in cases with drastic
consequences. Georgia courts have dismissed several indictments
against people because they could not be brought to trial fast
Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse, and
Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12, 14 (2004) (“[W]hile there are things
[we] may have to give up in these trying fiscal times, justice cannot and must not
be one of them.”).
72. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 5; see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N,
supra note 29, at 1; Threadbare American Justice, supra note 30 (“As they cut spending
on the courts, state legislatures are degrading public safety by delaying the
resolution of criminal cases; [and] hurting vulnerable populations like children
and the elderly . . . .”).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Minnesota Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants the same right. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; see also State v. Widell, 258
N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1977).
74. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.09 provides that, following a
speedy trial demand, a criminal defendant’s trial must commence within sixty days
unless good cause is shown. If a trial does not start within sixty days, a
presumption is raised in favor of concluding that the defendant’s speedy trial right
was violated, and the courts look to a four-factor balancing test to determine
whether it has been deprived. See, e.g., Widell, 258 N.W.2d at 796 (citing Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)) (providing that the four factors to be considered are
the length of the delay; the reason for the delay; whether the defendant asserted
his right to a speedy trial; and whether the delay prejudiced the defendant).
75. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 6; see also COST OF JUSTICE, supra
note 26, at 4 (delaying criminal trials means that “[i]nnocent people may . . .
languish in jail, or potentially dangerous criminals may be released, denying
justice to crime victims and endangering public safety”).
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76

enough.
In one instance, two murder suspects were set free
77
because prosecutors took four years to indict the suspects. The
prosecutors in that case claimed that “strained resources were
78
partly to blame for the delay.” Budget constraints causing delays
in Oregon’s criminal justice system resulted in three criminal
defendants being released in a single day due to speedy trial
79
violations.
In Washington State, crowded court calendars have
80
caused speedy trial violations for a decade. In one tragic case, a
violent felon was “[r]eleased from prison, . . . broke into the home
of a young mother and raped her, and while fleeing from police,
crashed his vehicle into a motorist, killing [an] innocent
81
bystander.”
In Minnesota, criminal appellants have had convictions
82
reversed on speedy trial grounds in recent years. In State v. Colbert,
Colbert’s simple robbery and first-degree aggravated robbery
83
convictions were overturned due to a speedy trial violation.
Colbert was arrested on October 16, 2007, and made a speedy trial
demand on November 7, 2007, but his trial did not start until
84
August 5, 2009; 659 days after arrest. Colbert’s trial was delayed
several times, but at least six months of the delay were attributable

76. See, e.g., Kemp v. State, 724 S.E.2d 41, 46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing
and remanding a conviction for a determination of whether a defendant’s speedy
trial right was violated due to congested court calendars).
77. Criminal Justice System Faces Crises Due to State Budget Cuts, supra note 27.
78. Id.
79. See State v. Adams, 116 P.3d 898 (Or. 2005); State v. Davids, 116 P.3d 894
(Or. 2005); State v. Johnson, 116 P.3d 879 (Or. 2005); see also COST OF JUSTICE,
supra note 26, at 7 (noting that at least two wily Oregonian thieves have caught on
to the budgetary constraints in the judiciary and discussing how an accused car
thief went on a spree in which he allegedly stole five cars from sale lots. “He was
arrested and released three times in one month because the judicial system lacked
resources to provide him with a lawyer and thus could not prosecute him.
Another car thief was arrested and released seventeen times”).
80. CRISIS IN WASHINGTON, supra note 25, at 4, 34.
81. Id. at 4.
82. See, e.g., State v. Colbert, No. A10-55, 2011 WL 67785, at *6 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 11, 2011) (reversing conviction for speedy trial violation); State v.
Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming convictions against
speedy trial arguments, but confirming that “good cause for delay does not include
calendar congestion” (emphasis added)). But cf. State v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 32
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing defense counsel’s unsuccessful argument that
conviction should be reversed due to speedy trial violation caused by courtfunding-related delays).
83. 2011 WL 67785, at *6.
84. Id. at *1.
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85

to the court’s calendar congestion. While the prosecutor argued
that delay due to the court’s overcrowded calendar should not
count against the State, the court of appeals explained that
“[o]vercrowding in the court system is not a valid reason for
denying a defendant a speedy trial,” and that “[t]he responsibility
for an overburdened judicial system cannot, after all, rest with the
86
defendant.”
In concluding that Colbert’s conviction must be
reversed due to a speedy trial violation, the court lamented that
“the delays in this case likely were an undesirable consequence of the
87
budgetary constraints on our judicial system.”
While speedy trial violations in the criminal realm are the most
apparent consequence of overcrowded courts, the ramifications of
delays can be just as significant in the civil realm. The Minnesota
Constitution’s guarantee of prompt justice does not distinguish
criminal and civil cases. But, because speedy trial and other
legitimate public safety concerns make it important to prioritize
88
criminal cases, delays in the civil actions are often more lengthy.
For example, in many states, custody disputes are being delayed for
years; plaintiffs with meritorious claims are being forced to settle
89
cases for far less than they are worth rather than wait for justice;
and court services to the indigent, crime victims, homeless, nonEnglish speakers, and the disabled are being curtailed or
90
eliminated.
Sadly, delays due to a lack of funding in sensitive civil matters
91
can lead to tragic results. In Washington, overcrowding in the
92
court system caused significant delays in child welfare cases. In
one such case, child welfare officials attempted to permanently
remove a three-year-old girl from her mother, a woman with drug
and other substance abuse problems, so that the girl could be
93
adopted. But the delays lasted so long that the original officials
were taken off the case, and new officials decided to reunite the girl

85. Id. at *4.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
88. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 5; Schwartz, supra note 36
(discussing that a Georgia district court put a moratorium on all civil trials in 2009
in an effort to meet criminal defendants’ speedy trial demands).
89. Dixon, supra note 22, at 43.
90. Id.
91. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 5.
92. See CRISIS IN WASHINGTON, supra note 25, at 4–5, 20.
93. Id. at 5, 20.
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with her mother. Tragically, the mother viciously kicked her little
95
girl to death within a year. Here, in Minnesota, budget cuts to the
court-funded guardian ad litem program have also resulted in
tragedy. In 2004, a court evaluator (without the assistance of a
guardian ad litem due to budget constraints) recommended that a
young girl be placed into the care of a convicted child-sex
96
offender. Only months later, the man was “charged with three
97
counts of felony sexual molestation involving [that] little girl.” As
these examples illustrate, the human costs associated with judicial
budget cuts have been great.
Delays in the judicial system also have significant negative
impacts on businesses and state economies. It has long been
generally accepted that “legal institutions are crucial to economic
98
development.”
The theory is fairly simple. Legal institutions
provide ordered society, and order makes economic development
99
more likely.
Moreover, it is widely accepted that delays in the
administration of justice increase the cost on litigants and their law
100
firms, preventing them from using their resources elsewhere.
These truisms have been confirmed in recent studies on the effects
of underfunded courts in Georgia and California.
A 2011 study on the economic impact of delays in Georgia’s
court system recognized that the court system is a key to the
economic development of Georgia because “the efficient
disposition of civil, domestic relations and criminal cases
101
impacts . . . both the business and social climate” of the state.
The study concluded that “[c]ourt delays due to the lack of proper
funding represent dead-weight cost to the economy in terms of lost
102
economic output, labor income and fiscal revenues.”
Lack of

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 6–7.
97. Id.
98. F.B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1738 (2002).
99. See, e.g., id. at 1738–39.
100. See DELAYS IN GEORGIA, supra note 36, at 10–11 (stating that a major
negative economic impact of court funding problems are the “[o]pportunities
forgone as businesses and individuals deal with the uncertainty of having to wait
for the Court System to hear their case and render a decision,” and acknowledging
that “case delays result in additional costs for all litigants [though s]ome costs can
be quantified while others cannot”); Weise, supra note 22 (“The longer [a case]
drags out, the cost of representing [a] company increases.”).
101. DELAYS IN GEORGIA, supra note 36, at 1.
102. Id.
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court funding over several years, according to the study, resulted in
the loss of between 3,457 and 7,098 private and public sector
103
jobs.
It was estimated that court delays brought on by a lack of
funding decreased the total income of Georgia’s workers anywhere
104
And court delays
from $176 million to $375 million each year.
were projected to decrease Georgia’s GDP by between $243 million
105
and $583 million annually.
Overall, the inadequately funded
courts in Georgia were expected to adversely affect Georgia’s
106
economy by between $337 million and $802 million annually.
After reviewing this eye-opening study, Carol W. Hunstein, Chief
Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, opined that she did not
“know that you would have a new business or corporation that
would want to relocate in a state where you couldn’t get your
contract disputes or your business disputes resolved in a timely
107
fashion.”
A 2009 study of the economic impacts of court cutbacks on Los
108
The main
Angeles made similar findings and conclusions.
impact of underfunding, according to the study, would be
109
courtroom closures resulting in delays. The study predicted that
the caseload clearance rates—the difference between the number
of cases filed and the number of cases disposed of—“would decline
110
at an even greater pace” due to cutbacks.
As a result, “the
average time between filing and disposition [of civil cases would]
increase by more than 150 percent . . . [to an average of] four-and-a111
half years.”
The study noted that delays in case dispositions raise
uncertainty among business and that “uncertainty makes businesses
112
less prone to invest and expand operations” because “generally,
resources at issue between litigants are removed from circulation

103. Significantly, most of the jobs lost were in the high-wage (and thus high
tax bracket), high-knowledge industries. Id. at 14.
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1.
107. Schwartz, supra note 36.
108. See WEINSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 22, at 17. The Los Angeles Superior
Court system is akin to many states’ entire trial court system. With over 600
courtrooms and over 2.8 million filings per year, it is the largest trial court system
in the country. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id. at 5–6.
111. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 10.
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until disputes are resolved.”
Overall, the study concluded that
the consequences of the judicial budget cuts, in Los Angeles alone,
would be severe. Through 2013, those consequences were
projected to be: “$30 billion in lost economic output, including
losses of $13 billion resulting from decreased legal services and $15
billion associated with additional uncertainty on the part of
litigants . . . [a]pproximately 150,000 lost jobs . . . [and] $1.6 billion
114
in forgone state and local tax revenue.”
The Georgia and California studies demonstrate the irony of
cutting judicial budgets.
By underfunding the judiciary,
legislatures “think [they are] saving a million dollars . . . . But in
fact [they are] incurring tens of millions of dollars of costs on
consumers of the justice system who now have to wait, have to
travel, have to incur additional fees—have to just generally have
115
justice delayed.” Simply put, there are dire constitutional, public
safety, and economic consequences to underfunding our court
systems, consequences that plainly outweigh the illusory benefits
offered to support such cuts.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is clear that our courts are in a budgetary crisis. But why?
Why, with all the negative impacts associated with underfunded
courts, have legislatures across the country seen fit to cut judicial
budgets? There appear to be two answers. The first is the lack of a
116
unified constituency for the courts.
While many in the legal
community are taking notice of the problem, more need to take
117
action to present a united front to our state legislatures.
The
second, related to the first, is a lack of public knowledge of the
problem. While the courts exist to serve all members of the public,
most people “have had no experience with the courts and may not

113. Id. at 15.
114. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
115. Smith, supra note 50.
116. See, e.g., COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 2.
117. Smith, supra note 50 (noting that court funding issues have “united
supporters as disparate as the NAACP and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s
Institute for Legal Reform”).
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recognize their importance unless, and until, they need them.” It
is incumbent upon all of us in the legal profession to do more to
inform the public of what is at stake if the courts continue to suffer
from budgetary setbacks.
In Minnesota, we have begun what must be an ongoing
grassroots education campaign on the topic of an adequately
funded justice system, and we have launched a broad-based,
119
organized lobbying effort.
We assembled a coalition of justice
system partners to lobby on behalf of the justice system during the
last budget-setting legislative session. As a result of these efforts, we
were successful in reversing the trend of three straight years of
120
budget cuts for our courts.
We also saw our public defenders
121
Other areas of the
receive a very small increase in their budget.
justice system, however, continued to suffer cuts, including civil
122
legal services, confirming that there is so much work yet to be
done.
The education campaign we began must continue, and it must
be expanded if the justice system is going to be well-positioned for
the hard conversations and the competition for the allocation of
scarce public resources in the years to come. The Minnesota State
Bar Association (MSBA) is partnering with the Judicial Branch in
this effort. The MSBA has created the AMICUS Society as a way to
solidify and institutionalize its commitment to the ongoing
123
conversation with the people of Minnesota.
Through the
AMICUS Society, lawyers all across Minnesota have committed to
118. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 2 (advocating drastic action and
encouraging that “judges close their courtrooms and release [criminal]
defendants . . . so that the public becomes aware of the budgetary crisis”); see also
Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial
Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217, 251 (1993).
119. See Terry Votel, Wherever Two or More Are Gathered, BENCH & B. MINN., (Dec.
14,
2010),
http://mnbenchbar.com/2010/12/%E2%80%9Cwherever-two-or
-more-are-gathered%E2%80%9D/ (discussing the Coalition to Preserve
Minnesota’s Justice System’s concerted lobbying efforts).
120. Compare Act of July 20, 2011, ch. 1, art. 1, §§ 3–10, 2011 Minn. Laws 693,
694–96, with Act of April 1, 2010, ch. 215, art. 11, §§ 3–9, 2010 Minn. Laws 219,
278, and Act of May 15, 2009, ch. 83, art. 1, §§ 3–9, 2009 Minn. Laws 1024,
1025–1027 (court-related appropriations 2009–2013).
121. Compare § 10, 2011 Minn. Laws at 696, with § 9, 2010 Minn. Laws at 278,
and § 9, 2009 Minn. Laws at 1027.
122. Compare § 3, subd. 3(a), 2011 Minn. Laws at 695, with § 3, subd. 3, 2010
Minn. Laws at 278, and § 3, subd. 3, 2009 Minn. Laws at 1026.
123. Brent Routman, The AMICUS Society: Advocates for Justice, BENCH & B. MINN.
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://mnbenchbar.com/2012/02/the-amicus-society-advocates
-for-justice/.
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shape opinions of leaders and legislators in their communities
about the importance of adequate funding for Minnesota’s justice
124
system.
We are hopeful that by taking our case directly to the
people in a sustained, organized way, our message will be heard
and understood.
Ultimately, it is up to “we the people” of Minnesota to ensure
that the promise we made to each other in our constitution
continues to be a first principle in Minnesota. If we are successful,
we will help keep the promise of Minnesota. We will also help to
ensure that the inspiring command from our first chief justice—
that in Minnesota no one can be denied the right to “simple
125
justice” —continues to be reality.

124.
125.

Id.
Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 23, 7 Gil. 1, 11 (1862).
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